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Abstract 
This paper analyses the determinants of broadband Internet access prices 
in a group of 15 EU countries between 2008 and 2011. Using a rich panel 
dataset of broadband plans, we show the positive effect of downstream 
speed on prices, and report that cable and fibre-to-the-home technologies 
are available at lower prices per Mbps than xDSL technology. Operators’ 
marketing strategies are also analysed as we show how much prices rise 
when the broadband service is offered in a bundle with voice telephony 
and/or television, and how much they fall when download volume caps 
are included. The most insightful results of this study are provided by a 
group of metrics that represent the situation of competition and entry 
patterns in the broadband market. We show that consumer segmentation 
positively affects prices. On the other hand, broadband prices are higher 
in countries where entrants make greater use of bitstream access and lower 
when they use more intensively direct access (local loop unbundling). 
However, we do not find a significant effect of inter-platform competition 
on prices. 
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21. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, millions of people in the European Union have installed broadband 
in their households1, enabling them to download information and use sophisticated digital 
services2. Broadband Internet access is an essential component of inclusiveness in the 21st 
century, and households without access to this service are in risk of becoming marginalized 
from society and economic opportunity. Several papers have analyzed the impact that 
technological change and regulation have had in the expansion of Internet. However, little 
attention has been given to how telecommunication operators have modified their business 
strategies to respond to market evolution and competition. A detailed analysis of the 
managerial behaviour of operators is essential if we are to understand the significant price 
and quality differences that have emerged across Europe. 
This paper examines the factors determining fixed broadband Internet prices in 15 EU 
countries between 2008 and 20113. We employ a rich data set that contains both the 
commercial and technical characteristics of 2,204 plans offered by incumbent and entrant 
operators. By using an instrumental variable approach we estimate a pricing equation using 
three types of variable: (1) the technical characteristics of the plans; (2) the operators’ 
commercial strategies; and (3) the patterns of competition in the country. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper to use information at the level of the individual firm’s 
commercial plans to examine the determinants of prices in the EU. 
Our study shows how operators adjust their prices to the technological characteristics of 
the plans. First, we show that downstream speed has a positive and significant non-linear 
impact on price: a 10 Mbps increase in the downstream speed increases the price by around 
5%. And second, after controlling for downstream speed, we find that cable or fibre-to-
the-home (FTTH) broadband plans are cheaper than xDSL offers. This result is important 
for orienting regulatory policy in the sector, as it questions the interest that operators might 
have for deploying Next Generation Access Networks (NGAs).  
This paper also shows the importance of the operators’ commercial practices. Thus while 
flat rate plans are more expensive than metered plans (which are limited in volume), plans 
that offer a broadband service bundled with voice telephony and/or television are 
considerably higher in price, especially in the case of triple packages.  Given the importance 
of such bundling practices in many European markets today, we also analyse the main 
determinants of this commercial practice.  
Finally, we examine how levels of competition and regulation affect operators’ pricing 
decisions. We show that incumbents set prices that are often significantly higher than those 
of their competitors, which might be a consequence of such factors as their wider 
                                               
1 The European Commission (2008) defines broadband internet access as “an access assuring an always-on 
service with speeds in excess of 144 kbps. This speed is measured in download terms.”
2 During the nineties, broadband was delivered over cable and telephone lines. In the years that followed, 
these technologies where upgraded and some operators began to deploy fibre to the home delivery, which 
supports higher bandwidth (Greenstein and McDevitt, 2011a and 2011b).
3 In spite of their growing relevance, broadband mobile services are not included in this analysis. Note that 
the commercial characteristics of mobile offers differ markedly from those of fixed broadband Internet 
access. For example, download speed is significantly slower in the case of mobile offers (although new 
wireless technologies such as LTE can  provide speeds similar to fixed broadband) 
3coverage, reputation, or the existence of consumer switching costs. In contrast, the degree 
of price dispersion and the overall number of plans offered in any given country have a 
positive effect on prices. This result illustrates that market segmentation and consumer 
confusion in the face of various marketing plans allow operators to increase their prices. 
A further contribution of this paper is to identify the effects of access regulation. We find 
that prices are higher in countries where entrants make much greater use of bitstream 
access, and lower in markets where they rely more heavily on direct access (local loop 
unbundling, LLU). Despite this, we observe no significant effect on prices when entrants 
upgrade their own networks, nor do we find any effect of inter-platform competition 
between xDSL, cable and FTTx. These results might be interpreted as a consequence of 
the application of a “ladder of investment” approach (LOI),4 whereby in order to promote 
sector competition regulators need initially to facilitate the access of new entrants to the 
incumbent’s network so as to guarantee service-based competition, and subsequently, once 
these entrants have acquired experience and reputation they need to provide incentives to 
entrants to invest in their own infrastructure. In this way, the long-term benefits of facility-
based competition can be reconciled with short-term price reductions. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic literature, so 
as to highlight the contributions of this paper, and it describes the European broadband 
market. Section 3 outlines our estimation strategy. Section 4 describes the data set. Section 
5 presents the empirical strategy and results and Section 6 discusses the main contributions. 
Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review and European broadband market 
2.1 Broadband access: the literature  
 
The initial empirical literature on broadband Internet access focussed on the determinants 
of its penetration. For example, Distaso, Lupi and Manenti (2006) reported the impact of 
inter-platform competition on broadband penetration in 14 European countries from 2000 
to 2004. They found that while inter-platform competition had a positive effect on 
penetration, intra-platform did not play an important role. Other studies, including Höffler 
(2007), highlighted the inefficiencies created by the duplication of existing platforms. 
 
More recent papers have analysed the impact of access policies on the investment decisions 
of firms and on the diffusion of the service.5 Grajek and Röller (2012) examine the effects 
of access regulation on incentives for investment in 20 countries in the period 1997-2006. 
They report that regulation discourages the investment of incumbents and individual 
entrants, and suggest that the European regulatory framework fails to provide incentives 
for facility-based competition. They also examine the regulators’ response to infrastructure 
investments, concluding that access regulation is not affected by entrants’ investments, but 
rather that the intensity of regulation reflects the incumbent’s investments. Bouckaert, Van 
                                               
4The “ladder of investment” regulatory model was first identified by Cave (2006). See Cambini and Jiang 
(2009) for an extensive review of the literature on this topic and Bourreau et al. (2010) for a critical analysis of 
this regulatory approach.
5 A detailed review of the theoretical literature on access charges in telecommunications can be found in 
Laffont and Tirole (2000), Arsmtrong (2002), and Vogelsang (2006).
4Dijk and Verboven (2010) investigate the influence of competition on broadband 
penetration in a sample of 20 OECD countries. They consider three entry patterns adopted 
by broadband operators: (1) inter-platform competition, where the incumbent xDSL 
operators compete with infrastructure-based operators (e.g. cable and FTTH); (2) facility-
based intra-platform competition, in which entrants lease some unbundled local loop 
elements, but have to invest in their own equipment and facilities (e.g. LLU and share 
lines); and (3) service-based intra-platform competition, where entrants resell the 
incumbent’s services (bitstream access/resale). According to these authors, only 
infrastructure-based competition increases the penetration of the service, while the other 
types have little effect.  
 
Few papers have undertaken specific country studies. Pereira and Ribeiro (2010) examine 
the competition between xDSL and cable operators in Portugal. They find that inter-
platform competition (mainly between xDSL and cable) increases the diffusion of Internet 
thanks to both the higher coverage of broadband access and the existence of lower prices. 
More recently, Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven (2012) have analysed the impact of 
unbundling on broadband penetration in the UK during the period 2005-2010 using micro 
level information. They find that LLU had little or no effect on broadband penetration, 
although it increased the quality of the service in terms of average broadband speed. On 
the other hand, they show that inter-platform competition from cable increased local 
broadband penetration. 
 
Many of the above results contrast with those reported by Gruber and Koutroumpis (2013) 
who, when drawing on data from 167 countries between 2000 and 2010, find that inter-
platform competition is an impediment to broadband adoption. They conclude that 
markets that focus specifically on one type of technology typically present a more rapid 
adoption process than that experienced in multi-technology markets. They suggest that this 
is because the latter type of competition requires the duplication of networks, which 
increases costs and, ultimately, prices. In contrast, full retail unbundling increases the 
diffusion of the service. 
 
While there have been several studies of broadband penetration in recent years, the 
determinants of the prices of the service have received much less attention.6 Explanations 
for this include the absence of consistent data, and the fact that broadband services are 
highly varied and typically offered jointly with voice telephony and television. An exception 
is provided by Wallsten and Riso (2010), who examine a data set comprising 30 OECD 
countries between 2007 and 2009. They find that downstream speed had a positive effect 
on prices, that broadband plans with bit caps were on average offered at lower prices than 
unlimited plans with contracts, and that plans with contracts were typically less expensive 
than those without. Their paper has several points in common with our study, but they do 
not examine the impact of access regulation on retail prices.  
 
Greenstein and McDevitt (2011) also analyse the economic value created by the diffusion 
of broadband Internet provided via xDSL and cable in the United States. They do not have 
direct information on prices, but create a price index that allows them to adjust the price to 
the progressive improvement in service quality. Taking this into account, they show that 
broadband prices in the US fell slightly during the period 2004-2009. This is a very 
                                               
6 Galperin (2012) describes the evolution of broadband prices in Latin America.
5different evolution to that of the prices of electronic products, including laptops and 
printers, where the quality-adjusted price falls have been significant.  
 
 
2.2 The European broadband market 
In July 2011, the average penetration level of fixed broadband Internet access in the 
European Union was 27.2%7. However, there were significant differences across member 
States. For example, while the penetration levels in Netherlands, Denmark and France were 
39.3, 38.5 and 33.9%, respectively, in Romania, Bulgaria and Poland they were 14.6, 15.6 
and 16.4%, respectively (Figure 1).8 
Figure 1: Fixed broadband penetration and incumbent’s penetration in 2011 (%) 
 
Source: European Commission (2011a). 
 
 
Figure 2: Fixed broadband prices in 2011 (€ PPP) 
Least expensive offer (all ISPs): Basket 4096 kbps-8192 kbps, 5GB or 20 hours/month 
 
Source: European Commission (2011b). 
 
 
 
                                               
7 The penetration of large screen mobile broadband subscriptions (using dedicated data cards or USB 
modems) was 7.5 % in July 2011.
8 See European Commission Implementation Reports and European Commission (2011a and 2011b).
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6In recent years, the prices of fixed broadband Internet access have fallen significantly, 
which is quite remarkable if we consider that operators have significantly improved the 
quality of their offers. They often allow consumers to migrate at no cost to other offers 
providing higher download speeds. Moreover, there is a trend towards bundling 
complementary services, such as broadband with fixed voice and TV, and more recently 
with mobile telephony (voice and data). Such packages allow operators to attract new 
consumers (the bundle being cheaper than the sum of the single services) and, at the same 
time, to gain the loyalty of their subscribers.  
 
This situation has not prevented significant price differences across European countries 
(Figure 2).9 These differences can be accounted for in part by technical and commercial 
features, but they also reflect the level of competition in the market. Thus, while in 2011 
the incumbent’s market shares in Finland, Cyprus and Luxemburg were 79, 73 and 72%, 
respectively; in the UK, Bulgaria and Romania they were 29, 29 and 30%. Many member 
States have four or five alternative operators, but other markets are much more 
fragmented. For example, in Germany there are around 100 regional entrants, though the 
incumbent retains a 46% market share. The objective of our paper is to analyse how 
technical, commercial and regulatory factors affect prices and to understand how they 
determine price differences across member States.  
 
Broadband access can be provided via several technologies. In the period we study, the 
most frequently employed system is xDSL followed by cable modem, but some operators 
use FTTH or wireless technologies such as 3G, Wimax and satellite. Around 77% of the 
fixed access lines in European countries use the xDSL technology, which explains why the 
average speed is still quite low (around 10 Mbps) and why there is more intra-platform than 
inter-platform competition. 
 
Incumbent operators are usually vertically integrated (except in Sweden, the UK and Italy) 
and use xDSL (although some use cable, for example Portugal). Most entrants use the 
incumbent’s network to provide their services and have to pay a regulated access fee. Cable 
operators have built their own infrastructure, but they also need to sign interconnection 
agreements with incumbent operators because of their limited national coverage. 
 
In the EU, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) set interconnection prices in order to 
guarantee an adequate development of competition. There are two mandatory types of 
access. Entrants can access the incumbent’s network directly (LLU) or indirectly 
(bitstream). At the same time, the direct access can be of three types: complete unbundling 
of the local loop, where entrants pay to use the incumbent’s access lines without any 
restriction; shared LLU, where entrants use the high frequencies of the access lines to 
provide broadband and incumbents use the low frequencies to provide voice telephony; 
and, shared LLU without voice telephony (naked ADSL), which is similar to the previous 
service but voice telephony is offered over the Internet (VoIP). The main advantages of 
unbundling are, therefore, to allow entrants to offer a differentiated service and to develop 
their own commercial policy.  
 
                                               
9 In the EU, retail prices of broadband services are not regulated. However, national regulators periodically 
assess whether there is a “margin squeeze” that reduces the profitability of entrants. This might occur, for 
example, when the level of interconnection prices (wholesale access prices) make impossible to entrants from 
matching the incumbent’s offers.
7In the case of indirect access (bitstream), entrants can access the incumbent’s network at 
two levels: at the ATM level (or Gig-ADSL), where there are several geographical 
interconnections, and at the IP level (or ADSL-IP), which is more expensive because there 
are fewer interconnection points.  
 
Price regulation of all these access services is an essential instrument for promoting 
competition and investment. Regulated access prices determine in which part of the 
incumbent’s network the entrants will choose to invest and influence both retail prices and 
service quality. In the EU, following the “ladder of investment” (LOI) regulatory model, 
regulators set the prices of indirect and direct access (bitstream and LLU) in order to 
provide incentives to entrants to invest progressively in their own equipment. In spite of 
this, the empirical literature is still unclear about the effectiveness of this strategy (Hazlett 
and Bazelon, 2005; Bourreau and Dogan, 2006; Waverman et al., 2007; Bacache et al., 
2011, and Grajek and Röller, 2012). As Bourreau et al. (2010) explain, the main problem of 
the LOI is that once entrants obtain some profits with bitstream access, their incentives to 
invest may not be so high, creating a “replacement effect”. Moreover, the simultaneous 
presence of multiple access levels can hinder incentives to access higher rungs on the 
investment ladder. Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on access regulation by 
assessing how the degree of intensity of each type of entry in a country affects retail prices. 
  
 
3. Estimation strategy 
This section examines the prices of broadband Internet access in 15 European countries in 
the period 2008-2011. After adjusting for the hedonic features of the operators’ plans, we 
analyse the impact of several commercial strategies adopted by operators, including 
bundling and market segmentation. Additionally, we assess how different entry patterns 
(bitstream, LLU and own network) induced by access regulations affect retail prices.  
We estimate a model for the prices of broadband residential plans (pmit), where m is the 
offer, i is the country, and t is the time period. The explanatory variables that we use in the 
estimation can be grouped into three blocks: (1) technical characteristics of the service; (2) 
the operators’ commercial strategies and (3) measures of competition and regulation in the 
country. We also control for the degree of penetration of the service in the country, as well 
as fixed country and time effects. Specifically, we estimate the following model:  
 
pmit = a0 + a1Speedmit +a2 Speedmit2 +a3Technologymit  
 
                                       Technical characteristics 
+a4Bundlingmit +a5VoIPmit +a6Datacapmit + a7Volumecapmit 
                                                  Commercial  characteristics                                                                            
+a8Incumbentmit. + a9PDispersionit +a10NOffersit+a11HHIPlatit + a12Bitstreamit + a13Directaccessit + a14Ownetworkit                               
                                                                                            Measures of competition and regulation 
+a15Penetrationit + a16Regiont +a17Timet +emit 
  
 
 
8The prices charged by operators in each country may vary according to the quality of the 
service and the access technology. In our model, Speed is the downstream speed specified in 
the technical details of the operators’ plans. To account for a possible non-linear 
relationship between price and speed, the equation also includes the square of the speed. 
Technology is the access technology used to provide the service; this might be xDSL, cable, 
or fibre (FTTH). We expect each technology to have a different effect on the price given 
that they require different levels of investment and bandwidths, and because consumers 
might have different “perceptions” of the quality of each technology. 
The price equation also includes commercial practices that may be adopted by operators. 
Bundling refers to a broadband service provided together with voice telephony and/or 
television. The commercialisation of broadband with other services implies additional costs 
for the operators that can justify a price increase. For example, to be able to offer television 
services, operators must first reach agreements with TV channels and pay them a 
compensation. The variable VoIP reflects the situation where the broadband service is 
bundled together with voice telephony but provided over IP, which reduces the operators’ 
costs (naked xDSL).10 
Datacap is a dummy variable that shows if the plan includes a restriction in the user’s 
downstream volume (consumers have to pay an extra charge when they exceed the 
established cap), and Volumecap measures the volume of data that the user can download. A 
priori, we expect the capped offers to be cheaper than those with unlimited downstream 
capacity, and also for prices to increase with the volume of the download limit. 
We examine a group of variables that reflect the competition in the national markets. 
Incumbent is a dummy that identifies the different pricing policies of the incumbent and the 
entrants. Incumbents may have market power thanks to certain advantages of reputation or 
to the existence of consumer switching costs. They may also have cost advantages over 
their rivals. Yet, European operators may be the incumbent in one country and the entrant 
in another or others. Thus, the costs of incumbent operators are also related to their 
presence in several countries and to their bargaining power with their equipment providers. 
HHIPlat is the concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in terms of technology 
shares. A higher HHIPlat would mean a high concentration of a particular technology in a 
given country. As discussed in Section 2, the empirical literature is ambiguous with regard 
to the effect of inter-platform competition on the diffusion of the service (see, for example, 
Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven, 2010 and Gruber and Koutroumpis, 2013), and its 
effect on prices is also unclear. Here, a factor that should be considered is that inter-
platform competition allows operators to differentiate their services, which might offset 
price reductions due to higher competition between different platforms. 
PDispersion measures the price dispersion of all the plans commercialised in the country, 
and NOffers is the number of plans offered by the incumbent. Both variables are proxies of 
the degree of price discrimination in the market. Incumbents can offer a large number of 
plans to better respond to competitors that target specific groups of consumers, but they 
can also segment the market if they have market power.  
                                               
10 Our model does not consider if the consumer can subscribe separately to each service (“menu à la carte”) 
or if the client has no option other than to contract the bundle (so-called Tying). The reason is that it is 
difficult to gather this information and also the problem of multicollinearity between the variables Tying and 
Bundling.
9Finally, a principal objective of this study is to determine how different types of entry in the 
country (bitstream, LLU and the development of entrants’ own networks) affect the 
operators’ pricing strategies. Bitstream, Directaccess, and Ownnetwork are explanatory variables 
that reflect the relative importance of these entry patterns. Notice that important 
distinctions can be drawn between Ownnetwork and HHIPlat. Thus, while the former 
identifies an entrant that bypasses the incumbent’s network (implying the duplication of 
networks), the latter reflects the presence of different technologies in the country, though 
not necessarily the duplication of networks, i.e., the market might be geographically 
segmented by technologies11. The inclusion of these variables in the pricing equation is 
useful to analyse the effects of access regulation, although there are other important aspects 
that also determine the entry strategy of operators, including the investment that is needed 
to deploy the equipment, the operators’ perceptions of consumer willingness to pay for 
high-quality services, or the regulatory institutions in the country.  
Unfortunately, our data set does not provide any information about the number of clients 
that subscribed to each of the commercial plans. Yet, the variable Penetration offers details 
of the number of subscribers in each country for five different speed ranges. In the 
presence of economies of scale, we expect operators to set lower prices as they have a 
larger penetration and more subscribers to their plans. However, this effect may be 
moderated when the increase in penetration is achieved as a result of extending service 
coverage to high cost/low density regions.  
 
 
4. The data 
 
We use a panel data of residential retail broadband offers in 15 European member States 
for the period December 2008 to June 2011. The countries analysed represent more than 
80% of the total broadband access lines in the EU. On average the data set contains 
around 550 offers per year and an overall total of 2,204 observations (Table 1). The sample 
includes the tariffs of operators whose accumulative subscribers represent over 90% of the 
broadband market in each country. Most of our data are drawn from Quantum-Web Ltd. 
Data for the countries’ penetration rates and socio-economic variables are provided by the 
European Commission, Eurostat and UNESCO. 
 
Information concerning the technical and commercial characteristics of each offer is 
collected primarily from the operators’ web sites by Quantum-Web. It should be stressed 
that the prices offered on these sites might differ in some cases from those offered via 
other sales channels (e.g. operators’ retail shops). Likewise, operators may negotiate 
discounts with consumers when the latter have received better offers from rivals or when 
they want to attract new subscribers. In the case of the technical characteristics, note that 
the download speed advertised might not be uniform across all households. 
The price of the offer used as the dependent variable is the monthly payment in euros 
advertised by the operator and adjusted by each country’s purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Some offers include the monthly line rental fee, which is commonly associated with voice 
telephony. This is typically the case for xDSL, unless the voice service is provided via 
VoIP, but not in the cases of cable and FTTH technologies. To account for this situation, 
                                               
11 An example of market segmentation by technology is Belgium where the broadband lines in Flanders are 
usually cable, while in Wallonia there is a more intensive use of xDSL.
10
we consider the price of each offer as being the sum of the access fee (the line rental) and 
the broadband service tariff12. Note that in some cases the offer establishes limits to the 
downstream volume, which means that consumers have to pay an additional charge once 
this limit has been exceeded. Our price does not include these additional payments, 
although the variables Datacap and Volumecap control for this situation. 
We use two hedonic variables to estimate the price. Speed is the quality of the service 
advertised on the operators’ web pages and is measured in Mbps. The minimum speed in 
our sample is 0.128 kbps and the maximum is 500 Mbps. However, a significant number of 
plans offer a quality between 10 and 30 Mbps (Table 2). 
  
Source: Quantum Web-Ltd
The variable Technology reflects the type of access used to provide the service; this can be 
xDSL, cable or FTTH. Taking this into account, the variable takes a value of 1, 2 or 3, 
respectively. It should be stressed that the download speed is related to the technology 
used in providing the service. Thus, xDSL cannot offer more than 30 Mbps, with the sole 
exception of VDSL which can reach 50 Mbps. By contrast, cable supports speeds of up to 
100 Mbps (DOCSIS3.0) and FTTH can attain download speeds of 1 Gbps. Also, an 
operator’s bundling strategy depends on its technology. xDSL is usually bundled with voice 
telephony, but not with television because good quality cannot be guaranteed. Cable and 
FTTH, on the other hand, are often provided together with television.  
Broadband access can be bundled with other services and commercialised at a single price. 
To identify the incremental price that this implies, the variable Bundle takes values of 1, 2, 3 
or 4, depending on whether broadband access is offered individually or bundled with fixed 
voice telephony, TV, or with both13.  
                                               
12 Prices do not include any other costs, such as the price of routers or the installation fee. 
13 In contrast with Wallsten and Riso (2010), we have no information about the number of channels in triple 
play packages. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Period 2008-2011
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum 
Values
Maximum 
Values
Price (euros) 2204 35.8 14.8 7.1 138.5
Price Single broadband (euros) 909 30.3 12.3 7.3 82.5
Price Broadband and voice (euros) 699 35.9 12.9 7.1 107.7
Price Broadband and TV (euros) 116 39.7 12.9 15.1 72.2
PriceBroadband, voice and TV (euros) 480 45.2 16.8 13.8 138.5
Price for Metered offers (euros) 410 36.7 14.7 7.1 79.8
Volume cap (Gb) 410 64.0 135.9 0.4 1000.0
Speed (Mbps) 2204 23.8 32.6 0.1 500.0
HHI inter-platform 2204 63.6 17.2 38.0 100.0
Bitstream access Index 2204 4.2 8.3 0.0 48.27
Direct access Index 2204 32.1 44.7 0.2 171.7
Own network access Index 2204 52.1 76.5 0.0 405.9
11
Datacap is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the offer includes a limit to the 
downstream volume, and 0 otherwise. The variable Volumecap measures the limit to the 
download capacity (rated in GB) in offers with a downstream volume. Consumers usually 
pay an extra charge if they exceed the downstream limit, but as explained above we do not 
consider these charges in our analysis14. 
Competition and regulation are essential aspects for understanding the operators’ pricing 
policy. Our dataset provides information about the number of lines per operator in each 
country, classified according to the technology used and the type of access (bitstream, 
direct access, and own network). We use this information to construct concentration 
indexes that measure the entry patterns in each country. Bitstream access concentration 
(Bitstream) is defined as the square of the entrants’ bitstream market share (GigADSL o IP-
ADSL) in the country divided by the square of the incumbent’s market share. Direct access 
concentration (Directaccess) is the square of the entrants’ direct access market share divided 
by the square of the incumbent’s market share. Own network concentration (Ownnetwork) is 
the sum of the squares of the entrants’ market share of own lines divided by the square of 
the incumbent’s market share. As such, these indexes show the relevance of alternative 
entry patterns in relation to the incumbent’s market share. In most European countries, 
broadband services are in the main provided by legacy communication infrastructure, 
where the incumbent operator maintains significant market power. Taking this into 
account, we analyse how the intensity of different entry patterns with respect to the 
incumbent’s position affects prices, and we also examine the response of prices to each 
entry pattern. 
A further instrument for measuring the competition level is the concentration of 
technological platforms. To capture this, HHIPlat is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for 
each country, which is estimated by adding the sum of the squares of market shares by 
technology (xDSL, cable, FTTx).  
PDispersion and NOffers can be interpreted as proxies of the degree of price discrimination, 
and are calculated with the information obtained by Quantum-Web from the operators’ 
web sites. PDispersion is the standard deviation of broadband prices, and is calculated as the 
square root of the variance in prices in each country for each year. NOffers is the number of 
offers commercialised by the incumbent in each country and in each year. We might 
alternatively have used the total number of offers commercialised in the country, but have 
opted not to do so as we are unsure that our data set contains information about all 
existing entrants. 
Penetration is defined as the number of broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in a 
country. For the level of penetration we use EU information for five downstream speed 
ranges: (1) below 2 Mbps, (2) 2-9.99 Mbps, (3) 10-29.99 Mbps, (4) 30-99.99 Mbps, and (5) 
above 100 Mbps (ultrafast speed). The last two ranges are usually provided by cable or 
FTTx, although the VDSL can also support speeds up to 50 Mbps. 
                                               
14Metered broadband plans charge for an additional capacity (GB) and some offers are time metered. The 
extra costs (the so-called overage charges) are paid per GB or per a discrete number of extra GB, and less 
frequently the plan charges per day, hour or minute above the cap limit. In some cases, no overage charges 
are made and the broadband plans experience a sharp reduction in download speed once the cap has been 
exceeded (bandwidth throttling). 
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The pricing equation also includes the dummy variable Region to account for the 
unobserved heterogeneity in each market. The EU-15 countries have been clustered into 
three groups owing to very high multicollinearity between country dummies. We have 
tested that there are no significant differences in prices within each group after controlling 
for the rest of the variables. In this way we avoid problems of multicollinearity and the loss 
of degrees of freedom in the regression. The Region variable takes a value of 1 for Spain, 
Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal; 2 for Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland 
and Ireland; and 3 for France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and United Kingdom. Finally, Time, 
is a dummy fixed effect for each year. 
 
For illustrative purposes, Table 2 shows some of the most relevant characteristics of the 
broadband plans for each country in 2011. The table highlights the differences across 
countries in terms of price and download speed. Direct observation of these statistics 
suggests that average prices might be affected by the speeds, but also by other factors such 
as bundling or volume caps. The econometric analysis conducted in the next section seeks 
to identify the main factors determining the operator prices and sheds some light on the 
differences across countries. 
Source: Quantum-Web Ltd 
 
 
5. Estimation and results 
 
This section presents an econometric multivariate analysis of the factors influencing 
broadband Internet access prices. We estimate the pricing equation using three estimation 
procedures: ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS-IV) and three-stage 
least squares estimations (3SLS-IV)15. We believe that our OLS estimates may suffer from 
an endogeneity problem. Indeed, economic theory suggests that in countries where prices 
are low, penetration levels might be higher. In such a case, the OLS coefficients of 
                                               
15 We have discarded the use of a fixed effects model because of the severe attrition or identification of our 
broadband plans (offers change over time or are substituted by others) and the little variance in our 
observations during the period considered (with information covering four years). We have also ruled out the 
use of a random effects model because the unobserved heterogeneity (the firm or country unobserved 
characteristics) will be correlated with the explanatory variables in the pricing equation.
Table 2: Residential Broadband Plans. Characteristics by Country in 2011
Observa-
tions
Number of 
Operators
Average 
Price 
(euros)
Average 
Download 
Speed 
Bundling  
(% bundled 
plans)
Metered 
Offers (%)
Average 
Volume Cap 
(Gb)
Bitstream 
market 
share (%)
ULL market 
share (%)
Own Network 
market share 
(%)
Austria 71 7 39.6 29.9 58% 20% 58.4 2% 13% 25%
Belgium 32 5 42.6 20.2 34% 56% 25.5 5% 4% 37%
Denmark 12 3 25.9 27.3 58% 42% 208.3 7% 10% 22%
Finland 26 4 26.4 27.5 0% 4% 0.1 3% 2% 63%
France 46 5 34.3 52.9 93% - - 8% 43% 7%
Germany 55 10 26.6 28.2 65% 2% 1.8 7% 36% 12%
Greece 33 5 40.3 18.6 61% - - 2% 56% 0%
Ireland 38 4 38.1 17.3 55% 63% 29.2 20% 5% 26%
Italy 26 6 29.1 10.6 42% 15% 0.1 14% 30% 4%
Luxembourg 19 3 36.3 18.6 32% 16% 1.4 0% 11% 0%
Netherlands 60 9 39.3 29.6 53% - - 2% 13% 40%
Portugal 33 5 53.1 69.4 88% 39% 18.2 2% 9% 40%
Spain 47 7 56.9 20.9 89% 2% 0.0 6% 24% 18%
Sweden 53 5 28.7 36.9 32% - - 4% 14% 39%
UK 39 6 30.7 23.4 67% 31% 7.0 11% 38% 21%
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penetration are likely to be biased downwards, and so we would erroneously conclude that 
penetration has a smaller effect on price than it actually has. Taking this into account, we 
use instrumental variable techniques and we examine the possibility of using different 
socio-economic variables as instruments for Penetration: GDPpc is the gross domestic 
product per capita; Density is the number of inhabitants in the country divided by its area in 
square kilometres; Education is the percentage of population with upper-secondary 
education; and Unemployment is the unemployment rate in each country. Data for GDP, 
Density and Unemployment have been obtained from Eurostat, and Education from the 
UNESCO data base. 
 
We expect GDPpc, Density and Education to have a positive effect on the adoption of 
internet and Unemployment to have a negative effect. We expect GDPpc to affect Internet 
penetration but not broadband prices. In addition, both Price and GDPpc are adjusted by 
each country’s PPP so as to account for differences in the cost of living across EU member 
States. Density should reduce operator’s costs for network deployment and, hence, should 
have a positive effect on coverage. However, the effect of Density on price is unclear, since 
while Density is defined at a national level, population density can vary greatly across 
regions, which might affect the pricing decisions of incumbents and entrants. As for 
Education, we expect the more highly educated to be more likely to contract Internet, but 
the level of education should have no impact on the operators’ price setting decisions.   
 
Likewise, it should be noted that the concentration indexes (HHIPlat, Bitstream, Directaccess 
and Ownnetwork) might also be affected by an endogeneity problem since the entrants’ entry 
decisions could be determined simultaneously with prices. Yet, a high index value might 
also reflect the presence of efficient entrants that are able to provide the service at a low 
price, or who are perceived by consumers as being better. To account for this situation, our 
model includes country fixed effects to represent the unobserved characteristics that 
influence the efficiency of operators and, eventually, the level of retail prices. Examples of 
these unobserved effects include investments, administrative constraints, and state aid 
plans that are specific to each country.  
Table 3 reports the OLS and 2SLS/3SLS-IV estimates of the pricing equation. The first 
three columns present the OLS results. Specification 1 considers the technical 
characteristics of the offers and the commercial strategies of the operators. Specification 2 
includes the competition and regulatory variables and specification 3 adds Penetration. 
Finally, specifications 4 and 5 show the results of the 2SLS and 3SLS estimations using as 
instruments the socio-economic variables GDPpc, Density and Education. Since the 
dependent variable price is included in logs, Penetration is interpreted as a semi-elasticity. All 
specifications include the Time and Regional Effect dummy variables.  
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The estimates of the pricing equation are robust to the alternative specifications. Most of 
the coefficients in the regressions are significant and their signs are in line with our 
predictions.16 As expected, Speed increases broadband prices. Specifically, a 10 Mbps 
increase in speed raises broadband prices by an average of around 5%. However, the 
negative sign of Speed2 reveals that price exhibits diminishing returns with respect to speed. 
Additionally, after controlling for other characteristics of the plans, xDSL appears to be 
more expensive than cable and FTTH. Fibre and cable technologies can provide higher 
speeds and better quality than xDSL, but it seems that this is not sufficient to enable 
entrants to charge higher prices per Mbps than are charged for xDSL. Such a situation can 
constitute an obstacle to the authorities’ objective of promoting investment in Next 
Generation Access Networks (NGAs). This finding might be justified by the fact that 
xDSL is often the only available technology in many regions and locations and as a 
consequence incumbents fix uniformly higher prices for low speed offers per Mbps than 
those set by cable and fibre operators, who tend to be present only in densely populated 
areas where there are several competitors. 
As for the operators’ commercial strategies, unlimited plans (flat rates) charge higher prices 
than metered plans. In the case of metered offers, when the volume cap is exhausted the 
average increase in the price for an extra GB is slightly lower than 0.05%. On the other 
hand, bundles of services are more expensive than stand-alone broadband plans. Offers 
combining broadband access and TV are more expensive than those that bundle 
broadband access and voice telephony. Specifically, broadband packages with voice or TV 
are 15 and 18% more expensive, respectively. When the offer includes both voice 
                                               
16 We test for multicollinearity using the variance inflator factor (VIF). Its mean equals 1.9 and the two highest 
values are 4.9 for Speed and 3.4 for Speed 2; the rest of the VIF values are below 3. 
Table 3: Estimation Results: All Broadband plans.  OLS; 2SLS/3SLS-IV
Dependent variable Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Log Price (price) OLS OLS OLS 2SLS-IV 3SLS-IV
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Penetration   -0.0057* (0.00312) -0.017** (0.00723) -0.019** (0.00723)
Speed 0.0065*** (0.00146) 0.0069*** (0.0014) 0.006*** (0.00159)   0.0042*** (0.00185) 0.0047*** (0.00107) 
Speed² -1.1e-05** (0.000004 -1.1e-05** (0.000004 -9.2e-06* (0.000004) -5.4e-06* (0.000005) -1.5e-05* (0.000003)
Technology dummy  (reference xDSL)
     Cable -0.092* (0.05150) -0.11** (0.04710) -0.11** (0.04577) -0.15*** (0.03449) -0.10** (0.02133)
     FTTx -0.11** (0.0582) -0.11** (0.05026) -0.12** (0.05135) -0.14** (0.04405) -0.11** (0.02515)
Metered offer (Data cap) -0.098 (0.05860) -0.17*** (0.05739) -0.18*** (0.05816)    -0.18*** (0.05773)    -0.16*** (0.01878)    
Volume cap 0.00043 (0.00030) 0.00049* (0.00023) 0.00049** (0.00022) 0.00048** (0.00021) 0.00042** (0.0001)   
Bundle (refrence stand alone broadband)
     Internet and voice 0.18*** (0.02848) 0.17*** (0.02719) 0.17*** (0.02591)     0.17*** (0.02372)      0.15*** (0.01482)      
     Internet and tv 0.19*** (0.04024) 0.20*** (0.03544) 0.20*** (0.03318)   0.21*** (0.03008)   0.18*** (0.02804)   
     Internet, voice and tv 0.36*** (0.05198) 0.34*** (0.04016) 0.34*** (0.03795) 0.34*** (0.03351) 0.31*** (0.01743)
VoIP -0.073 (0.04870) -0.077 (0.04668) -0.072 (0.04296) -0.063 (0.03831) -0.078*** (0.0232)
Incumbent 0.15*** (0.03165) 0.14*** (0.03282) 0.14*** (0.03265)    0.12*** (0.03099)    0.15*** (0.01836)    
HHIPlat  0.0014 (0.00110) 0.00089 (0.00116) -0.00016 (0.00080) -0.00035 (0.00113)
Bitstream  1.1*** (0.25199) 1*** (0.23629)          0.96*** (0.21353)     0.99*** (0.11317)     
Direct Access  -0.16*** (0.05061) -0.14** (0.04868) -0.092* (0.04770) -0.073** (0.03442)
Ownnetwork  0.004 (0.01470) -0.00062 (0.01290) -0.0095 (0.01254) -0.0099 (0.01112)
PDispersion  0.022*** (0.00710) 0.02*** (0.00625) 0.017*** (0.00530) 0.02*** (0.00327)
Noffers Incumbent  0.0023 (0.00222) 0.0043* (0.00225) 0.0081** (0.00409) 0.0026 (0.00289)
R 2 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.49
Number of  observations (N) 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204
Note: Robus t standard errors  are i n parenthes is . Signi ficance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels .
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telephony and television, prices rise by about 30%. By contrast, offers that include 
broadband and voice can be up to 7% cheaper if the voice service is supplied over IP 
(VoIP). 
 
In the case of the competition variables, incumbents’ plans are around 15% more 
expensive than entrants’ offers, which might reflect the formers’ dominant position in the 
market and “unobserved” quality differences as perceived by consumers. PDispersion and 
Noffers exhibit a positive effect on prices, which suggests that when firms are better able to 
screen consumers they set higher prices, and that a large number of plans of varying 
characteristics and prices might generate a certain confusion among consumers, thus, 
allowing firms to set higher prices (Hoernig, 2001). We also find that technological 
concentration, measured with the variable HHIPlat, does not have a significant effect on 
prices.  
 
Our estimates show the entry pattern to be an important determinant of broadband prices 
in a country. While the intensity of Bitstream entry increases prices, Direct Access (LLU) 
reduces them, and Ownetwork does not entail a significant effect. On the other hand, the 
coefficient associated with Bitstream is higher than that associated with Direct Access, 
indicating that with an equivalent variation in the index there will be a greater price reaction 
with Bitstream. One explanation is that LLU allows operators to differentiate their products 
and to develop their own commercial strategies, which may avoid large price reductions for 
equivalent levels of entry.  
 
As expected, the OLS estimate shows that the Penetration variable has a negative effect on 
prices. However, OLS may produce biased estimators if price and penetration are 
determined simultaneously. To account for this, we applied the instrumental variable 
approach (2SLS) using as our instrument a combination of the previously defined socio-
economic variables GDPpc, Density, Education and Unemployment. 
 
 
 
Table 4 presents the result of the Hausman test that confirms that Penetration is an 
endogenous variable. It also shows the results of the validity tests for different 
combinations of instruments. The instruments in the second and third specification pass 
the Hansen’s J test for over-identifying restrictions and are also shown to be suitable for 
explaining Penetration. However, the validity test results for GDPpc and Unemployment (Test 
Result 1) are not satisfactory. Moreover, Hansen’s J test value for the third specification is 
lower than the second value. Therefore we use GDPpc, Density and Education as our 
instruments. 
 
Finally, we apply the instrument suitability tests (the F-statistic in the first stage regression 
of the variable Penetration) to verify that the instruments are strong. Additionally, the 
computed standard errors are robust to any bias from heteroskedasticity and they are also 
clustered according to observations from the same country. 
Table 4: Endogeneity test for Penetration 
Hausman endogeneity test. Ho: Penetration  exogenous p-value= 0.0000  
Instruments for Penetration GDPpc, Unemployment
GDPpc, Education, 
Density
GDPpc, Education, 
Density, Unemployment
Test Test Result 1 Test Result 2 Test Result 3
Hansen J test. Ho: instruments exogenous p-value=0.1162 p-value=0.1691 p-value=0.1140
Validity of Instruments Ho: weak instruments p-value=0.1489 p-value=0.0001 p-value=0.0001
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Usually, in simultaneous equation models (SEM), the variables determined simultaneously 
(in this case, Price and Penetration) are correlated with the error term in the regression, 
causing the OLS coefficients to be biased and inconsistent. To overcome this problem, we 
have also estimated the pricing equation using 3SLS, which is a more efficient method17. 
 
The results of the 2SLS and 3SLS estimations are shown in columns 4 and 5 in Table 3. We 
find that the technical, commercial, and competition coefficients are robust to the use of 
these estimation techniques. In the case of Penetration the sign of the coefficient is 
maintained, but its value is higher than that obtained with the OLS regression. In the case 
of the 3SLS-IV regression, the coefficient β̃P-3SLS= -0.019 implies that a one-percentage- 
point increase in the penetration level is followed by a 1.9% fall in price. The negative 
estimate of Penetration instrumented through the socio-economic variables more than triples 
the OLS coefficient, showing that the OLS Penetration coefficient was downward biased.  
 
We also considered the effect of using the lagged Penetration variable as our instrument, 
where LagPenetration and Lag2Penetration are defined as the variable lagged one and two 
periods, respectively. Table 5 shows the Hausman endogeneity test for the lags of 
Penetration. Both variables are endogenous but their Hausman chi-square test values are 
lower than that for Penetration. The latter can be accounted for by the fact that prices and 
the subscription decision are determined in the same period and, as such, the simultaneity 
problem should be reduced for lagged periods of penetration. We ran the same OLS 
regression as specification 3 in Table 3 and found that the coefficient is β̃LagPenetration-OLS= -
0.007 when we consider one lag and β ̃Lag2Penetration-OLS= -0.0076 when we consider two lags of 
Penetration, and in the two cases the coefficients are significant at the 5% level. These results 
confirm that the simultaneity bias is downwards.  
 
 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Below we discuss in greater detail two key features that affect the operators’ commercial 
policies: their bundling strategies and entry patterns. 
 
Bundling strategies - A commercial strategy widely adopted by telecom operators in the 
EU is that of bundling several services together in the same offer. Our analysis shows how 
each additional service in such a bundle increases the price of the broadband plan. 
However, standalone broadband and bundled offers can be considered as different 
products and operators price them differently. To account for this possibility, we present 
                                               
17 The 3SLS estimation of the model takes into account the structural equations for both Price and Penetration 
and uses the cross-equation correlation of errors to provide more efficient estimators than the 2SLS 
estimation. The procedure involves an additional step to the 2SLS procedure: namely, it uses the residuals 
from both the Price and Penetration structural equations to construct a covariance matrix of errors that 
provides a more efficient estimation.
Table 5: Endogeneity test for  Penetration  and Lags of Penetration
Hausman endogeneity test. Ho: Penetration  exogenous Chi2(1)= 38.345 (p-value = 0.0000)
Hausman endogeneity test. Ho: LagPenetration  exogenous Chi2(1)= 31.801 (p-value = 0.0000)
Hausman endogeneity test. Ho: Lag2Penetration  exogenous Chi2(1)= 7.725 (p-value = 0.0054)
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separate estimations for standalone broadband and for the bundle of broadband and voice 
services18. Table 6 shows that these new estimations are very similar to those found when 
we consider all offers. In the 2SLS and 3SLS estimations, Penetration is still instrumented by 
the socio-economic variables GDPpc, Density, and Education, but its coefficient is no longer 
significant19. By contrast, HHIPlat is now significant, indicating that a higher concentration 
of one technological platform (less inter-platform competition) raises prices. In the case of 
bundles, this result might be further reinforced because cable and FTTH are more likely to 
offer TV than is the case with ADSL. As a result, technological concentration generates 
higher prices for bundled offers. 
 
                                               
18 In the case of bundle offers, we are unable to identify the price of each particular service, but we can 
observe how the price of an offer increases as other services are integrated. Wallsten and Riso (2008) also 
adopt this approach when analyzing bundling.
19 The penetration information we use is based on the whole sample since it is not possible to distinguish 
between penetrations rates that depend on bundled plans, on the one hand, and those that depend on 
unbundled plans, on the other.
Table 6: Estimation Results: Standalone Broadband and Bundles. OLS; 2SLS/3SLS-IV
Dependent variable   
Log Price (price) OLS 2SLS-IV 3SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV 3SLS-IV
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Penetration -0.0019 0.0036 0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0041 -0.0057
(0.00331) (0.00824) (0.00919)  (0.00229) (0.00831) (0.00899)
Speed 0.0088***    0.0096*** 0.01*** 0.0071***    0.0070*** 0.0075***
(0.00185) (0.00160) (0.00144) (0.00185) (0.00239) (0.00215)
Speed² -1.5e-05*     -1.6e-05*     -1.9e-05***     -1.7e-05*     -1.6e-05*     -2.3e-05***     
(0.000005) (0.000005) (0.000003) (0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000008)
Technology dummy  (reference xDSL)
     Cable -0.18***    -0.17*** -0.12*** -0.11**    -0.11** -0.08***
(0.05689) (0.05295) (0.02962) (0.05119) (0.04786) (0.02969)
     FTTx -0.17**  -0.15**  -0.09**  -0.086  -0.087* -0.057**     
(0.07424) (0.06814) (0.04334) (0.06263) (0.05163) (0.03739)
Metered offer (Data cap) -0.15*               -0.14**              -0.1***               -0.2**               -0.2***              -0.18***               
(0.07203) (0.07050) (0.03117) (0.07460) (0.07306) (0.02791)
Volume cap 0.0003                 0.0003          0.00022               0.0006**              0.0006***            0.00055***          
(0.00030) (0.00029) (0.00014) (0.00023) (0.00021) (0.00015)
VoIP    -0.038 -0.038 -0.043
   (0.03779) (0.03572) (0.02913)
Incumbent 0.11**               0.12**               0.14***               0.18***               0.18***               0.2***               
(0.04379) (0.04662) (0.02936) (0.04249) (0.03574) (0.02773)
HHIPlat 0.0016* 0.0021*** 0.0024** 0.0042* 0.0042* 0.004**
(0.00077) (0.00066) (0.00113) (0.00217) (0.00218) (0.00131)
Bitstream 0.89***               0.93***               0.96***               0.86***               0.86***               0.86***               
(0.27161) (0.22084) (0.18773) (0.21209) (0.20025) (0.14252)
Direct Access -0.1   -0.12**   -0.11**   -0.17***   -0.17***   -0.16***   
(0.06613) (0.05136) (0.04758) (0.03608) (0.03444) (0.04247)
Ownnetwork -0.0058 0.00057 0.0036 -0.019 0.02 0.022
(0.01037) (0.01428) (0.01491) (0.08236) (0.08320) (0.05283)
PDispersion 0.023***              0.026*** 0.029*** 0.022***              0.022*** 0.022***
(0.00649) (0.00711) (0.00568) (0.00693) (0.00734) (0.00458)
Noffers Incumbent -0.00044              -0.0028                -0.0094*                 0.0075*                0.0075*                0.0052*                
(0.00383) (0.00372) (0.00487) (0.00412) (0.00415) (0.00307)
Regional Effect (reference Region 1)
      Region 2 -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24*** 
      Region 3 -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.39*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.42***
Time dummy (reference t=2008)
     t=2009 0.071 0.069 0.064** 0.061 0.061 0.059**
     t=2010 0.081 0.079* 0.072** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12***
     t=2011 0.11** 0.11** 0.097*** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15***
Cosntant 3.1*** 2.9*** 2.9*** 3*** 3.1*** 3.1***
R 2 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.58 0.58 0.57
Number of  observations (N) 909 909 909  699 699 699
Note: Robust standard errors  are in pa renthes i s . Signi fi cance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level .
Stand-alone Broadband Bundle: Broadband + Fixed Voice Telephony
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We are also interested in identifying the factors that serve as incentives for operators to 
commercialise bundled services, since significant differences can be observed across 
European countries (Table 2). In order to address this question we run logit and probit 
discrete choice models that consider 1,336 observations collected on a yearly basis between 
2008 and 2011. This regression focuses only on xDSL offers since bundling decisions differ 
substantially for cable and FTTH. For this sample, 42% of the offers are broadband 
standalone offers, 37% are bundles of broadband and voice, and 21% include TV, 
broadband and voice. 
The results of the estimation for Bundle are presented in Table 7. As expected, Speed 
increases the probability of broadband being bundled with other services. Clearly, high 
download speeds are necessary in order to offer TV. However, no significant distinction is 
observed between the bundling strategies of incumbents and entrants. Market and 
technological concentration (HHIOper and HHIPlat) are negatively associated with the 
probability of bundling. This suggests that bundling is used by operators to attract 
consumers in competitive markets, whereas in more concentrated markets operators prefer 
to sell additional services separately. We also consider the effects of price dispersion and 
find that it increases the probability of bundling. Therefore, in markets with a wide-range 
of prices, operators might commercialise bundles of services to differentiate their plans. 
Finally, no correlation is found between bitstream and direct access and bundling, although 
bundling is found to be less likely in markets where more entrants bypass the incumbent’s 
network (own network). 
 
Table 7: Logit/Probit for Bundling
Bundling Logit Probit
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient
Speed 0.033*** (0.00827) 0.02*** (0.004516)
Incumbent 0.38 (0.2556) 0.23 (0.15672)
HHIOperator -0.093** (0.03781) -0.057** (0.02286)
HHIPlat -0.035** (0.01614) -0.022** (0.00998)
PDispersion 0.062* (0.03288) 0.038* (0.01957)
Bitstream -0.9 (0.7889) -0.56 (0.4786)
Direct Access 0.1 (0.4771) 0.075 (0.2862)
Own network -2.8*** (0.8134) -1.7*** (0.5001)
GDPpc 0.003 (0.0053) 0.0022 (0.003317)
Education -0.017 (0.01455) -0.011 (0.00888)
Density 0.00072 (0.00059) 0.00045 (0.00037)
Regional Effect (ref: Region 1)
      Region 2 -0.3 (0.3644) -0.19 (0.2239) 
      Region 3 0.22 (0.4141) 0.14 (0.2555) 
Constant 5.8* (2.3438) 3.6** (1.4299)
Pseudo R 2 0.11 0.11
Number of observations (N) 1336 1336
Dependent variable
Note: Robust s tandard errors are i n parenthes is .                                    
Si gni fi cance at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% level .
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Entry pattern - One of the main results of our analysis is that broadband prices are 
negatively related with LLU entry intensity, and positively related with bitstream entry 
intensity. This result implies that during the period analysed intra-platform facility-based-
competition was more effective in reducing prices than was intra-platform service-based-
competition, once we control for other characteristics of the offer. At this juncture, it 
should be stressed that the intensity of each country’s entry pattern is influenced by the 
regulation of access charges. In fact, European regulators usually follow the LOI approach, 
which proposes setting higher prices for bitstream so as to induce entrants to use direct 
access (Cave, 2006; Höffler, 2007, Bourreau, Dögan and Manant, 2010). As shown in 
Bacache, Bourreau and Gaudin (2011), this regulatory strategy may have facilitated the 
migration from bitstream access lines to LLU, although their study does not find any ladder 
effect between LLU and entrants deploying their own network. 
The regulation of access charges in the EU has been designed to provide incentives for 
investment by entrants; however, in this paper we have also shown that it affects retail 
prices. Prices are higher in countries where entrants make greater use of bitstream entry 
and lower in countries where they make greater use of direct access. In fact, while the 
establishment of high access charges for bitstream might act as an incentive to incumbent 
operators to set higher uniform prices for their Internet plans, the establishment of low 
access charges for direct access might not result in an equivalent response by operators, 
since this type of entry requires major investment and because it allows operators to 
differentiate their product (Nardotto, Valletti and Verboven, 2012). This situation is 
reflected in our estimates of the Bitstream and Directaccess concentration indexes, since the 
value of the coefficient is much greater for the former than for the latter. For instance, in 
specification 5, β̃Bitstream-3SLS =0.99 and β̃Directaccess-3SLS =-0.073, which reflects the greater increase 
in prices due to bitstream concentration than the relative decrease due to LLU 
concentration. 
Our results also suggest that inter-platform competition does not affect significantly retail 
prices. Entrants that invest in cable and FTTH networks are able to commercialise high-
quality services, but this does not necessarily mean a reduction in their retail prices. 
Moreover, although cable and FTTH plans involve lower prices per Mbps than those 
charged by xDSL plans, the former typically offer more downstream speed and additional 
services such as TV, which increase prices. A further important aspect that should be taken 
into account when interpreting our results is that in our model competition is introduced at 
the national level, but in some countries technologies are geographically segmented and so 
there is little competition between them.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the determinants of the prices of broadband Internet access in 15 
countries of the EU between 2008 and 2011. Our econometric model has focused on three 
types of variable: (1) the technical characteristics of the offers; (2) the operators’ 
commercial strategies; and (3) the regulation and competition in the country. Besides, we 
have controlled for the potential endogeneity of broadband penetration by using the 
instrumental variable approach (2SLS/3SLS) and employing as instruments a group of 
socio-economic variables that determine the demand for broadband services in each 
country. 
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Our analysis has revealed that downstream speed is a significant driver of price: a 10 Mbps 
increase in the download speed causes prices to rise by an average of around 5%. 
Additionally, we have found that the price per Mbps paid for the service via cable or fibre 
technologies is lower than that provided by xDSL, although these technologies usually 
provide higher download speeds. On the other hand, the xDSL service usually involves 
more intra-platform competition and has a wider coverage than other technologies. In this 
context, an important question that emerges is whether consumer willingness to pay for 
fibre and cable plans is sufficiently high to encourage operators to invest in NGAs. 
The operators’ marketing strategies also play an important role in determining prices. When 
the broadband service is bundled with voice telephony, the price increases by around 15% 
and when it is bundled with both voice telephony and television it increases by around 
30%. By contrast, consumers that contract the voice service through VoIP obtain 
significant price reductions.  We have also shown that operators are less likely to bundle 
their offers when the market is less competitive or when there is less inter-platform 
competition. 
This paper has also contributed to the literature that analyzes how regulatory policy can 
influence the development of the broadband market. Here, we have shown that broadband 
prices are higher in countries where entrants make greater use of bitstream access and 
lower in those countries making greater use of LLU. We have found no evidence that inter-
platform competition and stand-alone entry (the last rung on the “ladder of investment” 
approach) reduce prices. This means that when entrants bypass the incumbents’ networks, 
retail prices are not reduced. This might be because this type of entry does not generate 
sufficient competition, and because the operators offer high-quality products that are more 
expensive. All in all, our results can be interpreted as an assessment of the “ladder of 
investment” approach, and they show the benefits of facilitating migration from bitstream 
to LLU entry.  
 
One limitation of our study is that we have not considered mobile broadband plans offered 
via smartphones or dongles. Mobile broadband demand is boosting and future research 
needs to consider the impact of the firms’ commercial strategies for mobile broadband 
offers. For example, a rising number of operators are currently offering bundled mobile 
and fixed broadband packages, which minimises the consumer churn rate (Prince and 
Greenstein, 2011). 
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